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A. INTRODUCTION
The effect of error on contracts is a favourite topic in many legal systems. Scotland
is no exception,1 the literature providing extensive discussion of George Joseph
Bell’s analysis2 and of the case law since. The period before Bell, however, has
received less attention,3 and advantage has yet to be taken of recent research
which corrects the tendency to view European legal development as a monolithic
process.4
Examination of the earlier materials in light of this research reveals an attitude
to error which is quite different from that in modern European systems. While
the Scottish approach was rooted in the Roman law texts and the ius commune
tradition, it does not bear the marks of scholastic and natural law influences which
are central to the treatment of error in Continental systems today. This suggests
that it is wrong to characterise error in Scots law as a battleground between the
Common Law and a single Civilian view. Differences with France and Germany
are not necessarily indicative of English influence, and the choice may not be as
stark as T B Smith’s famous preference for “the stake with Stair” over “glory with
Gloag” makes it seem.5
Until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, lawyers in Scotland tended
to understand contract formation in terms of subjective consensus. Except where
it described voidness for initial impossibility (usually due to the absence of an
object of sale), error was merely one of the ways in which absence of consensus
was explained. Error was a bit like forgery. Lawyers often talk about forgery but
in most cases the fact that a document has been forged is not the really important
point. The important point is that the person whose signature has been forged has
not signed the document. For that reason, a doctrine of forgery is unnecessary:
the results are generated by the normal rules on consent. The same was true
of error.
1 J J Gow, “Mistake and error” (1952) 1 ICLQ 472; J J Gow, “Some observations on error” (1953) 65
JR 221; J J Gow, “Culpa in docendo” (1954) 66 JR 253; P Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract in
Roman and Scots Law (1958); T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 808-
833; J M Thomson, “The effect of error in the Scots law of contract” 1978 Acta Juridica 135; W W
McBryde, “Error”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland (2000) vol
2, 72; W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) paras 15-01 ff; W M Gloag and
R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 12th edn, by Lord Coulsfield, H L MacQueen et al (2007) paras
6.21-6.32; M Hogg, “The continuing confused saga of contract and error” (2009) 13 EdinLR 286.
2 G J Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 4th edn (1839) § 11. This was the last edition by Bell himself,
and the edition whose account of error was endorsed by Lord Watson in Stewart v Kennedy (No 2)
(1890) 17 R (HL) 25 at 28-29.
3 The early period is discussed by McBryde, “Error” (n 1) at 72-76.
4 J Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) and M J Schermaier, Die
Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (2000) are the most significant works for present purposes.
5 Smith, Short Commentary (n 1) 817.
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B. STAIR’S APPROACH
Recent scholarship has tempered the view that Stair created a law of contract
without reference to earlier native materials.6 Nonetheless his account remains
the starting point for any discussion of error. Although the topic was mentioned
in earlier Scottish materials,7 Stair’s major influence in these matters was clearly
European.
(1) The ius commune background8
Broadly speaking, the European background may be said to be composed of
two strands.9 The first was rooted in the efforts of the ius commune jurists to
rationalise the Digest texts on error in sale with the aid of Aristotle’s theory of
categories.10 In Roman law,11 sale was concluded by subjective consensus on
certain matters which were later classified as essentialia or substantialia negotii.12
These were distinguished from terms which the law would imply (naturalia
negotii) and those which might be described as optional extras (accidentalia
negotii).13 Without agreement on the substantialia there could be no sale. The
classical Roman law of error and the influence of Aristotelian philosophy on it
remain a matter of controversy.14 However, it is clear that most of the cases of
6 G Lubbe, “Formation of contract”, in Reid & Zimmermann (eds), History (n 1) vol 2, 1 at 1.
7 W W McBryde, “Error” (n 1) at 74. The earliest case I have found which discusses error in the relevant
sense is Hay v Cockburn (1697) Mor 13328.
8 Here the term ius commune is used to denote mediaeval and early modern writers in the Roman law (as
opposed to the canonist or natural law) tradition.
9 For the second strand, see B.(2) below. The multifarious nature of the ius commune means that
any brief account will inevitably be an oversimplification. For a more nuanced treatment, see
Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) and W Ernst, “Irrtum: Ein Streifzug durch
die Dogmengeschichte”, in R Zimmermann (ed), Störungen der Willensbildung bei Vertragschluss
(2007) 1.
10 Mediated through scholastic thinking: see Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4)
54-55.
11 For present purposes, the content of theDigest texts is more important than the classical law so modern
interpolation criticism can be ignored.
12 R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations (1990) 234 and authorities cited there. Other contracts, such
as lease and mandate, had different substantialia negotii.
13 The distinction between substantialia and accidentalia negotii was used by Azo, Summa Codicis
(undated, reprinted in Corpus Glossatorum Juris Civilis vol 2 (1966)) on C 4.54 n◦ 1. But the classic
statement came from Baldus, Commentaria in Digestum (1599, reprinted in Commentaria omnia von
Baldus de Ubaldus (2004)) on D 18.1.72pr. See Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4) 61-65. Stair was
aware of Baldus’ work, quoting the latter’s comment on D 45.1.10 in his inaugural oration before the
Faculty of Advocates, reprinted in “Scotstartvet’s Trew Relation” (1916) 13 Scottish Historical Review
380 at 389.
14 See M Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (1971) vol 1, 238 n 25; Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4)
57-58; M J Schermaier, Materia: Beiträge zur Frage der Naturphilosophie im klassischen römischen
Recht (1992) 105-162 esp 138-154; J D Harke, Si error aliquis intervenit – Irrtum im klassischen
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relevant error identified in the Digest (error in pretio (price), corpore (object),
persona (parties) and negotia (type of contract15))16 fit comfortably within the
substantialia of sale.17
The fact that the contract was formed by subjective consensus has important
consequences for our understanding of these instances of error.18 First, common
error in these matters was impossible because the parties’ common intention
constituted and defined the contract.19 So if both thought the price was x, the
price was indeed x; if both intended to contract regarding a certain object, that
was the object of their contract; if both thought they were agreeing a sale, that is
what they agreed. As the contract had no existence beyond the parties’ common
intention, it followed that the common intention could not be incorrect.
Secondly, unilateral error would mean dissensus: one party intended to sell
while the other intended to hire; one intended to sell x while the other intended
to buy y; A made an offer to B which was accepted by C. In the absence of an
objective approach to contracts, unilateral error amounted to a failure to agree
all that was required for a valid sale. Error, where relevant and possible, was
merely the real-world explanation for the legally relevant fact: the absence of the
necessary consensus. In the majorDigest text on error in sale, error and dissensus
appear to be equated.20 An incidental consequence is that the natural paradigm
for error was unilateral rather than common.
One category of error accepted in the Roman texts appears to present
problems for this analysis.21 Error about what an object was made of (error in
römischen Vertragsrecht (2005) and the review thereof by M J Schermaier in (2008) 125 Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 826; H H Jakobs, “D.18.1.11 nach
Überwindung der Interpolationistik” (2008) 125 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte
(Romanistische Abteilung) 375.
15 E.g. where one party thought it was a lease and the other thought it was a sale.
16 F de Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale (1945) 25; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 589-592.
17 Odofredus, a contemporary of Accursius, appears to have been the first to make the connection
between the categories of relevant error and the substantialia negotii in the context of Civil Law:
Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 51.
18 The significance and understanding of consensus in classical Roman law is contested but this at least
is the traditional view. See further D Daube, “Societas as a consensual contract” (1938) 6 CLJ 381 at
395-399; F Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 528; Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (n 14) vol 1,
237-238; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 563-565; M J Schermaier, “‘Nichtrömisches’ in römischen
Irrtumsrecht”, in P Pichonnaz (ed), Autour du droit des contrats: Contributions de droit romain en
l’honneur de Felix Wubbe (2009) 49 esp at 78-80; C Cascione, Consensus (2003); Harke, Si error aliqui
intervenit (n 14) 28, 32, 348. My knowledge of Cascione is restricted to the review by P Pichonnaz in
(2007) 124 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 504.
19 Discounting the rather unlikely case when both parties have the same incorrect belief about the identity
of one party.
20 D 18.1.9 (Ulpian).
21 Error regarding the sex or virginity of a slave is also mentioned (D 18.1.11.1 (Ulpian)) but this was
clearly of little relevance to Stair.
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substantia or materia) was fatal to a contract. To modern eyes, such an error
does not affect any of the substantialia negotii. Further, the fact that an object
is made of bronze rather than gold or a liquid is vinegar rather than wine is an
external reality, independent of the parties’ minds. This raises the possibility of
common error, which makes the result difficult to explain in terms of dissensus.
These issues have exercised generations of Roman lawyers and this is not the
place to revisit them in detail.22 However, examination of the major Digest text
on the point illustrates that, like the other cases, the effect of error in substantia
is explicable in terms of another rule:23
The next question is whether there is a good sale when there is no mistake over the
identity [corpore] of the thing but there is over its substance: Suppose that vinegar
is sold as wine, copper as gold or lead, or something else similar to silver as silver.
Marcellus, in the sixth book of his Digest, writes that there is a sale because there
is agreement on the thing [in corpus consensum est] despite the mistake over its
substance. I [Ulpian] would agree in the case of the wine, because the essence [ousia]
is much the same, that is, if the wine has gone sour; if it be not sour wine, however, but
was vinegar from the beginning such as brewed vinegar, then it emerges that one thing
has been sold for another. But in the other cases, I think that there is no sale by reason
of the error over the material.
According to Ulpian, error in substantia is relevant because it affects the essence
or ousia of the object. The latter term was central to Aristotle’s metaphysics and
theory of categories24 where it was used to denote those characteristics which
define an object’s identity so that object x is no longer object x if one of its essential
characteristics is changed.25 Classical Roman lawyers may not have understood
the text in this way,26 but Aristotle so dominated later mediaeval thought that it is
very likely that ius commune writers did.27
This approach amounts to treating error in substantia as an extension of error
in corpore. The characteristics which an object is believed to possess become
part of the way that the object is defined. Thus unilateral error regarding them
can create dissensus as to the object of sale.
In the case of common error there is no dissensus, but there is another
fundamental problem with the contract: the object of sale the parties had in mind
does not exist and the contract is therefore void for impossibility. It is as if they
22 For a summary, see Schermaier,Materia (n 14) 109-138 and 155-162; Harke, Si error aliquis intervenit
(n 14) 18; Schermaier (n 18).
23 D 18.1.9.2 (Ulpian) (transl ed A Watson, 1985).
24 See SMCohen, “Aristotle’s metaphysics”, and H Robinson, “Substance”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (available at http://plato.stanford.edu/).
25 Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4) 57-61.
26 The major modern treatment is Schermaier,Materia (n 14) 131-162.
27 See Gow, “Culpa in docendo” (n 1) at 258 attributing this view to Stair and Erskine.
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had pointed to an orange (both believing it to be an apple) and agreed to buy and
sell “this apple”. Such an agreement simply does not make sense.28
These reasons are technical rather than protective. The determining factor
is not that the buyer has been unfairly prejudiced: it is that there has been
no agreement or that there is no object of sale. This seems consistent with the
distinction drawn between wine which has gone sour and brewed vinegar. If the
rule had been deliberately designed to protect the buyer, it would be strange
to make its application turn on a question which is likely to be a matter of
indifference to him.
Arguably, some of the ius commune reasoning was a perversion rather than
an application of Aristotelian thinking.29 That does not, however, change the fact
that this thinking allowed the examples of relevant error to be understood as
describing either the absence of consensus or the absence of a comprehensibly
defined object of sale. Error itself seems, therefore, to have been a contextual or
explanatory rather than an analytical category.
(2) The scholastic-natural law background
The second strand of European development had its roots in Aquinas’ doctrine
of responsibility and flowed through scholastic canonists into natural law writings.
There was some interaction between the two strands: most notably, the distinction
between substantialia and accidentalia negotii appears to have been first
developed by scholastics.30 However, error played a fundamentally different, and
much more important, role in scholastic and natural law thinking.
(a) Aquinas
Aquinas’ scheme is concerned with whether an actor can be held responsible for
his conduct.31 He argues that responsibility for conduct depends on that conduct
being voluntary and that voluntariness requires knowledge.32 Ignorance which
28 A similar analysis has been presented to explain classical treatment of error in substantia. It is
particularly associated with the so-called Identifikationstheorie, most famously expounded by J GWolf,
Error im römischen Vertragsrecht (1961), which assumes a strictly objective approach to contracts,
but it has also been used by those who would invoke subjective dissensus as an explanation of other
cases: Kaser, Römischen Privatrecht (n 14) vol 1, 238; J A C Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976)
232. Thomas disapproves of the term “dissensus” (229) but he explains the other errors in terms of the
absence of consensus, using the latter term in its conventional sense.
29 Gordley, Philosophical Origins (n 4) 58-59; Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums
(n 4) 44.
30 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 54-55. See eg T Aquinas, Summa
Theologica I-II qu 7 art 1.
31 E.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II qu 6 art 2 obj 3 and reply.
32 Summa Theologica I-II qu 6 art 1.
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is not itself blameworthy and which “is the cause of the man’s willing what he
would not will otherwise” renders conduct involuntary and therefore exempts
from blame or responsibility.33
Aquinas characterises the “circumstances of an act” as accidents of that act (as
opposed to being part of its substance).34 Ignorance of such circumstances could
render conduct involuntary because circumstances, while “they are extrinsic to
the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it”.
The most important circumstance is the motive for the act.35 An error which
bears on motivation can render the act involuntary and thus free the actor from
responsibility. This focus on motive is one of the key differences between the
scholastic-natural law strand and the ius commune strand.
The conduct Aquinas has in mind is fundamentally different from the typical
context of error in the ius commune, the contract of sale. Rather than subjective
consensus, which has no existence outside the minds of the parties, Aquinas’ focus
is on acts with an external aspect, such as shooting an arrow.36 There is no doubt
that the arrow was shot. The question is whether the archer is accountable for
the conduct. In such cases, error affects responsibility for conduct. In the ius
commune model, on the other hand, it bears on the constitution of the act, on
whether the act has taken place.
If this model is to provide a complete account of error in contract – that is, one
which covers the situations described in terms of error in the ius commune – then
error must be separated from questions of constitution. Therefore, at the first
stage of analysis, contract formation must be considered in objective terms.37
That makes the existence of the contract a fact external to the parties’ minds.
When this step is taken a number of other possibilities arise.
First, one of the parties can actually be wrong about the price, the object
or whether the contract is of sale or of hire. Such errors are no longer simple
differences of opinion leading to dissensus.
Secondly, error can lead to voidability rather than voidness. On the old model a
contract has no existence beyond the shared will of the parties. Therefore, if there
is no common intent, there is nothing which could be enforced. Consequently,
voidability for error, which countenances effect being given despite dissensus,
is unworkable. Objective assessment of the formation of contracts avoids that
33 Summa Theologica qu 6 art 8 (transl Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920, available at
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/).
34 Summa Theologica I-II qu 7 art 1 resp.
35 Summa Theologica I-II qu 7 art 4 resp.
36 Summa Theologica I-II qu 6 art 8 resp.
37 E.g., O Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 67th edn, by P Bassenge et al (2008) § 119 Rn 7.
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problem because it gives the contract an existence independent of the parties’
minds.
Thirdly, the effect of error becomes a matter of legal policy rather than legal
logic. On the one hand, this allows the range of relevant errors to be extended
beyond the substantialia to other cases where it is felt that a party does not
deserve to be held to his bargain. Conversely, parties who are undeserving (those
whose error was inexcusable) or who have no interest (the non-erring party in
cases of unilateral error) can be denied the right to invoke the error.
This thinking was utilised by those who required that error be iustus and
by those who gave the erring party the option of rescission rather than simply
declaring the contract null.38 It also opened the door for error to be treated
alongside the other vices of consent: fraud, and force and fear.39
On such a model, cases of error are not explicable in terms of the technical
requirements for the conclusion of contracts; rather they are driven by whether
a party deserves protection from the consequences of error. On this basis, error
can take on an independent, creative role.
(b) Grotius
While it had a long pedigree before Grotius, the scholastic-natural law strand
was confined to the fringes of legal scholarship. Major proponents such as
Vascius, Molina and Lessius were primarily theologians and, while the approach
influenced humanism, the “law of reason” and the usus modernus pandectarum,
lawyers continued to draw heavily on the Roman texts and categories.40 The
continuing influence of the ius commune strand is clear in the works of Cujas,41
Blasius Altimarius42 and even Lessius.43 Grotius, however, rejected the Roman
38 Molinaeus was the first to take this step in his commentary on the Code, C 4.44, originally delivered
as lectures in Tübingen and published on his return to France: Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des
wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 90; P Arabeyre et al (eds), Dictionnaire historique des jurists français
XIIe–XXesiècle, 2nd edn (2008) 276; G Meyer, Charles Dumoulin: ein führender französischer
Rechtsgelehrter (1956) 21.
39 We see this in Donellus and Lessius. The tendency among the legists was to treat error as an aspect
of sale, and to discuss fraud and force together, following the pattern of the Digest: Schermaier, Die
Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 102, 136, 173-174.
40 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 83-88, 144-149, 152-171.
41 J Cujas, Opera omnia (1758) vol vii, cols 696-698; Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen
Irrtums (n 4) 99-102. Cujas did seek to unify substantia, materia and qualitas and thus to argue for
the relevance of error regarding qualitas.
42 B Altimarius, Tractatus de nullitatibus contractuum, quasi contractuum & distractuum (1720) rubr I
qu IX s IV no 19 ff.
43 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 138-139.
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approach outright, particularly the notion of error circa substantiam,44 and
adopted what Schermaier characterises as the “legal application of Thomas
Aquinas’ general theory of responsibility”.45 On this view, the sole criterion for
deciding the relevance of error was whether the promisor would have so promised
had he known the truth.46 Its basis was a supposed tacit condition that the promise
was only binding if the facts were as the promisor thought them to be. Like
Aquinas, Grotius took account of fault but he did so by imposing a duty of
compensation on the party in inexcusable error rather than by holding him to
his promise.47
As noted above, the scholastic analysis assumed an identifiable contract
to which effect could be given. However, its advocates had rather neglected
cases where there was subjective dissensus and thus apparently no contract.
This problem was addressed by Grotius. He explained that, while juridical
acts48 require a mental act, this can only be discerned by external indications.
These indications, however, reflect intention with “probable” rather than
“mathematical” certainty. The needs of “human society” demand that the risk of
divergence be borne by the speaker rather than the audience, so that “whatever
has been indicated is considered as true (pro vero habetur) in respect to him
who has indicated it”. Grotius’ doctrine of error was premised on an objectivist
approach to contract formation hitherto unknown in the ius commune.49
Grotius dealt with contract formation in the context of promising and by
reference to abandonment of possession, both of which are essentially unilateral
acts. Even if acceptance was required for a binding promise,50 the paradigm
remained that one party defined the content of the promise and the other
accepted it. In that, it prefigured the now familiar account of contract formation
by offer and acceptance.
Today this account so dominates our thinking that consensus is taken as
synonymous with an offer met by acceptance, other forms agreement being mere
44 Which in the translation of F W Kelsey (1925) is given as “errors which affect the substance of the
matter”.
45 H Grotius, De iuri belli ac pacis (1646) 2.11.6, Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums
(n 4) 174.
46 Grotius built his account of contracts on his account of promises and thus did not deal with formation
in his discussion of contracts (2.12).
47 De iuri belli ac pacis 2.11.6.
48 De iuri belli ac pacis 2.4.3. Grotius’ term is iuris effectus, translated by Kelsey as “actions at law”. The
context is abandonment of possession but his discussion of derivative acquisition (2.6.1-2) and promises
(2.11.4) depends on this account.
49 H Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht vol 1 (1985) 406; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 613.
50 As Grotius thought: De iuri belli ac pacis 2.11.14.
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footnotes or afterthoughts.51 In Roman law and for much of the ius commune
tradition, however, consensus was thought of as a single, common will.52 Such
a common will only makes sense on a subjective model of contract formation
because the point of objectivity is that it avoids looking into parties’ minds. Some
equivalent must therefore be found. The main equivalents are a single deed
signed by both parties or an offer met by an acceptance. Focus on these, rather
than on a meeting of minds, can be regarded as an indicator of a move towards
an objective approach to contract formation.53
While Grotius’ account proved too extreme to be deployed in full in any
modern system, it was the first comprehensive statement of error as an
independent doctrine rather than as a side effect of the rules of formation. As
such, it opened the door for a wider range of relevant errors and the possibility
of voidability rather than voidness as a consequence of error. These ideas had a
major impact on later Civilian development54 and these Grotian features are the
aspects of the Civilian approach stressed by T B Smith in his account of the Scots
law of error.55
(3) Stair as Grotius’ disciple?
Where does Stair fit in? His account of the origin of voluntary obligations is
reminiscent of Grotius’ discussion in De iure belli ac pacis.56 He echoes the
latter’s explanation of creation of voluntary obligations in terms of alienation of
freedom.57 Similarly, Stair’s identification of three “acts in the will” resembles
Grotius’ identification of three “modes of speech”.58 Further, there are some
suggestions that Stair, like Grotius, took an objective approach to formation
of contracts.59 So in his account of the conclusion of contracts Stair discusses
51 E.g. R Black, “Obligations”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 15 (1995) para
619; W D H Sellar, “Promise”, in Reid & Zimmermann, History (n 1) vol 2, 252 at 272; §§ 145-157
BGB.
52 Daube (n 18) at 395-399; Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 291-296;
M J Schermaier, “Die Willenserklärung (vor §§ 116 ff)”, in M Schmoeckel, J Rückert and
R Zimmermann (eds),Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB vol 1 (2003) 401 at 404-406. See also
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn (1989) sv “consent”; C T Lewis and C Short, A Latin Dictionary
(1879) sv “consentio”.
53 Note, for instance, the shift in emphasis in F Pollock, Principles of Contract 1-2 between the 1st edn
(1876) and the 9th edn (1921).
54 Evident, for instance, in art 1117 Code civil and § 119 BGB.
55 Smith, Short Commentary (n 1) 808-837 esp 814-818.
56 See G MacCormack, “Grotius and Stair on promises” (1977) 22 Am J Juris 160.
57 James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, 6th edn, by D M Walker
(1981) 1.10.1. Compare Grotius, De iuri belli ac pacis 2.11.1.
58 Stair, Institutions 1.10.2; Grotius, De iuri belli ac pacis 2.11.2-4.
59 Lubbe (n 6) at 17.
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offer and acceptance.60 And in considering the need for intention to create legal
relations, he stresses the need to interpret statements in light of their context and
continues:61
yet because it [the intention] is inward and unknown, it must be taken by the words
or other signs, so if the words be clearly obligatory and serious, no pretence that there
was no purpose to oblige will take place.
This seems close to Grotius’ argument for objective interpretation. Later, Stair
observes that “the act of contracting . . . must be of purpose to oblige, either really
or presumptively”.62
However, other aspects of Stair’s treatment indicate that he understood
contract formation in terms of subjective consensus. He argues that
“Conventional obligations do arise from our will and consent; for, as in the
beginning hath been shown, the will is the only faculty constituting rights”.63
Where Grotius’ three acts are external “modes of speech”, Stair’s are internal
“acts of the will”. “Paction” (Stair’s generic term for contractual agreement) is
described as “consent in [the parties’] wills”.64
Further, discussion of both offers and intention to create legal relations can be
read in a manner consistent with a subjective approach. Stair distinguishes65
betwixt promise, pollicitation or offer, paction and contract, the difference among
which is this, that the obligatory act of the will is sometimes absolute and pure, and
sometimes conditional, wherein the condition relates either unto the obligation itself,
or to the performance.
Offer is placed alongside promise and contract as a juridical act. It is not merely
a component of or a synonym for contractual consensus.
Stair does go on to say that “an offer accepted is a contract, because it is the
deed of two, the offerer and the accepter” but he also compares an unaccepted
offer to mandate.66 His purpose is to show that an offer lapses with the death
of the offerer but the parallel is instructive. Mandate confers on the mandatory
the power to bind the mandant to contracts, bypassing the normal requirements
of consensus.67 Stair could have understood offer in a similar way: conferring on
the offeree a power to create a contractual relationship between himself and the
60 Stair, Institutions 1.10.3.
61 1.10.6.
62 1.10.13.
63 1.10.1.
64 1.10.6.
65 1.10.3.
66 1.10.6.
67 1.12.17.
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offerer. Understood in this way, offer and acceptance do not bear on his basic
model of consensus any more than mandate and thus cannot be relied on to show
that Stair took an objective approach to the assessment of consensus.
Stair’s discussion of intention to create legal relations can also be interpreted
in a manner consistent with a subjective approach. This reading is based on what
might be called “evidential objectivism”. On this model, as a matter of substantive
law, the subjective will of the parties governs the agreement but a combination
of judicial scepticism and restrictions on proof makes it difficult to establish that
something other than the objective meaning of a statement was intended.68
Stair observes that “no pretence” of an absence of intention to oblige will be
accepted if the words are “clearly obligatory and serious”. As an assertion of the
truth is not a pretence, Stair’s assumption must be that the words did in fact
reflect the intent of the speaker. This approach may be contrasted with that of
Grotius. Unlike Stair, Grotius seems willing to countenance a divergence between
intention and expression. He holds the speaker to the latter, but his motivation
is protection of the hearer rather than scepticism about whether something else
was really intended.69
Evidential objectivism is also reflected in Stair’s gloss on the maxim plus valere
quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur:70 “more respect is to be had to what
appears by the writ, to have been the interest and design of the parties, than to
what the style appears”.71 Were it not for the words in italics, Stair’s gloss would be
unexceptional.72 Similar expressions are found in other ius commune discussions
of the topic.73 The maxim was understood as dictating that effect be given to the
true intention of the parties rather than to the formal expression. Stair reflects
68 For a similar construct in a very different context, see Jamieson v HM Advocate 1994 JC 88 at 92 per
Lord Justice-General Hope. Nor is the technique unique to Scotland: see H Coing, “Simulatio und
Fraus in der Lehre des Bartolus und Baldus”, in Festschrift Paul Koschaker (1939) vol 3, 402 at 406.
69 Grotius, De iuri belli ac pacis 2.4.3.
70 C 4.22, translated by S P Scott (1932) as “What has actually been done has more force than what has
been simulated and expressed in words” which is very close to the literal meaning. The sense in which
the maxim was understood in the ius commune is perhaps better captured by Bankton’s paraphrase
“That deeds are regarded as they are in Reality, and not according to their appearance”: see Andrew
McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (1751-1753; reprinted by
the Stair Society, vols 41-43, 1993-1995) 1.10.68. For the ius commune background see Zimmermann,
Obligations (n 12) 646-650.
71 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.42.21 (emphasis added). The 2nd edition of 1693 has “to what the Stile bears”
rather than “to what the style appears”. The variation does not affect the sense of the passage.
72 Although it is surprising that Stair invokes the maxim in his discussion of interpretation but not in his
discussion of simulation at 1.9.12.
73 See references in M D Blecher, “Simulated transactions in the later Civil Law” (1974) 91 SALJ 358;
G Wesener, “Das Scheingeschäft in der spätmittelalterlichen Jurisprudenz, im usus modernus und im
Naturrecht”, in G Baumgärtel et al (eds), Festschrift für H Hübner zum 70 Geburtstag (1984) 337.
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this general approach but he does so subject to a major evidential restriction:
true intention may only be gleaned from the deed itself.74
Concern with problems of proof is also evident in Stair’s discussion of error as
a defence in Book IV of the Institutions. He observes that “the exception upon
error is seldom relevant, because it depends upon the knowledge of the person
erring, which he can hardly prove”.75 The implication seems to be that, were
it not for problems of proof, error would be relevant much more often. This
theoretically wide field of application is restricted by procedural and practical
matters rather than substantive rules. Proof of error was made particularly
difficult because, until 1853, a party to an action was not a competent witness
on his own behalf.76
The effect of evidential objectivism is similar to that of substantive objectivism.
The difference between being bound to what you said because the court does
not believe that you meant something else and being bound because it does
not matter that you meant something else is not especially large. Evidential
objectivism allowed certain practical results to be reached without the need for
a reworking of the conceptual foundations of contract law. As such, it could
protect substantive rules which required subjective consensus from the practical
objections to which they would otherwise be vulnerable.
It might be objected that Grotius’ approach to juridical acts might also be
better understood in terms of evidential objectivism, particularly given his use
of the words pro vero habetur, and the fact that the reliance theory and its
Continental cousin the Erklärungstheorie (declaration theory) did not gather
serious steam until the nineteenth century. If this is the case, Stair’s subjectivist
approach could not be used to discount the natural law influence on his treatment
of error. However, as argued above, Grotius takes the possibility of divergence
between intent and expression much more seriously than Stair, analyses voluntary
obligations in terms of modes of speech rather than acts of will, and explains his
approach in terms of “human society”. This seems to place him much closer to
modern substantive objectivism than Stair.
(4) Error in Stair
Further doubt is cast on Grotius’ influence on Stair by examination of the passages
in the Institutions where error is addressed directly.
74 Cf A Favre, Codex Fabrianus (1610) 4.17 esp Definitio IV.
75 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.40.24.
76 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.43.7; Law of Evidence (Scotland) Act 1853 s 3.
398 the edinburgh law review Vol 14 2010
Discussing consent in contract Stair argues that “These [sic] who err in
the substantials of what is done, contract not”.77 In doing so, he adopts the
ius commune terminology rejected by Grotius, but he does not expand further.
Instead, he refers the reader back to his earlier treatment of fraud.78 There, Stair
gives a reasonably extensive account of error. He does so by contrasting it with
“circumvention”, which he defines, broadly, as “the act of fraud, whereby a person
is induced to a deed or obligation by deceit”.
Both error and circumvention require some mistake: as Stair stresses,
circumvention can only be said to cause a contract if the other party is deceived.
But the differences are more important than the similarities. To discuss these
properly, it is necessary to set out the key passage at length. Having noted that a
plea of fraud will be ineffective if the victim found out about it before acting and
decided to continue regardless, Stair continues:79
So neither doth error nor mistake, though it be the cause of the obligation or deed,
and be very prejudicial to the erring party. And though, if it had been fraudulently
induced by the other party, it would have been sufficient; yet not being so, there is
no circumvention: and the deed is valid, unless the error be in the substantials of
the deed, and then there is no true consent, and the deed is null; as if one married
Sempronia, supposing she were Maevia, the marriage hath no further progress (but by
subsequent consent) and it is void. But if he married Sempronia, supposing her to be
a virgin, rich or well-natured, which were the inductives to his consent, though he be
mistaken therein, seeing it is not in the substantials, the contract is valid. But if the
error or mistake, which gave the cause to the contract, were by machination, project or
endeavour, of any other than the party errant, it would be circumvention.
For Stair, the range of potentially relevant errors is narrower where the plea
is error in the substantials rather than error induced by circumvention. However,
the distinction between the two classes is not simply based on the seriousness of
the error. Stair states quite explicitly that an error may be “very prejudicial to the
erring party” but nonetheless irrelevant. This suggests that nullity for error is not
simply a rule for the protection of the erring party. With circumvention, on the
other hand, protection from the consequences of the other party’s deceit drives
the rule and so any error regarding a motivating factor is relevant.
Stair invokes the example of error in persona in marriage. Here there is no
“true consent” and as a result the marriage is “void”. In the case posited, there
was no consent at all: the groom agreed to marry Maevia, Sempronia agreed to
marry the groom and, as far as we know, Maevia did not agree to marry anyone.
77 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 1.10.13.
78 1.9.9.
79 1.9.9.
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This situation is contrasted with error regarding the “inductives to his consent”.
These are relevant for fraud but not for error. Stair’s language here reflects a
fundamental distinction: in the case of error there was no consent; in the case of
circumvention, there is consent (otherwise there could be no “inductives” to it).
The distinction between absence of consent (error) and real but defective
consent (circumvention) is also reflected in Stair’s discussion of their respective
consequences. As noted above, where there is error in the substantials the
contract does not come into existence: the deed or obligation is “null” and “void”
because those who err in the substantials “contract not”.80 On the other hand,
where fraud is pled, the injured party has the option of either “annulling the
contract” or claiming damages.81 The option and the idea of annulment seem to
imply that the contract subsists in the interim.
Later, discussing the capacity of oaths to prevent reduction, Stair contrasts
“fear such as stupifieth, and takes away the act or reason” and also “deceit . . . in
substanstialibus” with cases where the fear or fraud does no more than motivate
the act.82 In the former cases “there is nothing done” and so the oath cannot
exclude the plea while in the latter cases “the deed is in itself valid, though
annullable by fear or fraud, which are excluded by the oath”.
The factors which, in Stair’s account, distinguish circumvention from error
in the substantials are similar to those which mark out the natural law approach
from that of the ius commune: the range of relevant mistakes depends, not on a
predefined class of errors in the substantials, but on what motivated the contract-
ing party to act; the result is not a mere technical consequence but a protective
measure; and invalidity is not a matter of logical necessity but of policy choice.83
This impression is fortified by the discussion of the distinction between error
and circumvention as defences in Book IV.84 Once again Stair uses error in
persona as his example, this time by reference to the biblical account of Jacob’s
marriage to Leah when he expected to marry her sister Rachel.85 Three things
are clear from Stair’s analysis: were it not for Jacob’s ratification of the marriage,
Leah would not have been his wife; error, as well as circumvention, would have
been a plea open to him; and Jacob’s error was “by his own fault”. Taken together,
80 1.10.13.
81 1.9.14.
82 1.17.14.
83 Admittedly, the routes to the last point differ markedly. A contract is conceivable despite error, in
natural law theory, because of Grotius’ objective approach to juridical acts; it is conceivable despite
circumvention, in Stair’s account, because there is real, albeit defective, consent.
84 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.40.24.
85 Genesis 29: 15-30.
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these propositions suggest that Stair did not consider error to be affected by the
fault of the party in error or by the fact that the error was unilateral. It is perhaps
worthy of note that Stair did not feel the need to stress that unilateral error was
relevant. Given his essentially subjective approach to the conclusion of contract,
it seems likely that he thought the point obvious.
In this section, Stair also addresses a case of error as to the extent of the
subjects sold:86
if one should sell a barony, and the enumeration of the lands should include distant
lands, that were never united in the barony, nor in the rental by which it was sold, if
the seller were pursued to perfect the bargain, or on the warrandice, he would have
the exception of errore lapsus.
The case appears to be one of clerical error in a contract of sale by including in
the description lands which are not part of the barony being sold. On discovery of
this fact, the buyer was sued for breach of warrandice but escaped on the basis of
error. The fact that the lands had never belonged to the barony would if anything
make the error less excusable. However, Stair’s emphasis on this factor may be
explicable on another basis. If the lands had never been part of the barony, it is
unlikely that either party believed them to be so. If neither party believed them
to be part of the barony and they were not included in the rental which was
used to transfer the object of sale, it seems rather unlikely that the parties had
intended to include them in the sale. The best explanation for their inclusion in
the contract of sale might therefore be clerical error. This would be important
if Stair had the understanding of contractual formation suggested: substantive
rules which focussed on subjective consensus coupled with significant evidential
barriers to establishing that something other than the objective expression was
actually intended. The facts presented were, perhaps, sufficiently extreme to
overcome these barriers.
Further, the case posited tells us something important about how Stair thought
about error. If error is a vice of consent, like fraud or force and fear, it should
allow the party in error to strike the contract down, but it is difficult to see why
it should enable him to modify it. Vices of consent are ways of saying “I did not
agree properly” not ways of saying “we actually agreed this”.87 However, the latter
is what Stair suggests here. The contract of sale is not set aside completely; the
86 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.40.24. In this context “rental” refers to a breakdown of all feu and rental
income to which ownership of the lands gave right. It was sometimes incorporated into conveyancing
documents. Sale by rental was contrasted with a slump bargain (where there was no such specific
description). See J Burns, Conveyancing Practice, 3rd edn (1926) 343. The passage is not included in
the 4th and final edition (by F MacRitchie, 1957).
87 See Gillespie v Russel (1856) 18 D 677 at 685 per Lord Curriehill.
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seller merely escapes a plea for breach of warrandice. The result makes perfect
sense, however, if error is a way of directing attention to what the parties had
really agreed. On that view, they had never intended to contract regarding the
extra lands so there was no reason why the seller should have any obligations
regarding them.
It might be argued that Stair’s repeated reference to error in persona, and to
marriage as an example of it, indicate a canon law and thus a scholastic influence.
The textual basis for error in persona in sale in theCorpus Iuris Civilis is certainly
weaker than for the other classic cases of error.88 Schermaier goes so far as to
suggest that it was not properly recognised in the ius commune tradition until the
humanist period and that when it appeared it was a borrowing from canon law.89
However, he also acknowledges that error in persona was discussed alongside
the other classic cases by some of the post-glossators.90 Further, although the
issue would rarely arise in the typical case of sale (where the buyer and seller are
both present), the rules of contractual constitution and the fact that an obligation
was considered as a bond between two particular individuals surely demand
that it be relevant. Like the distinction between substantialia and accidentalia,
error in persona may have been first articulated clearly by scholastic scholars
but it accords equally with the ius commune tradition. Stair’s use of it cannot,
therefore, be taken to commit him to the scholastic-natural law view of other
issues.
Considered as a whole, Stair’s analysis of contracts seems to take a subjective
approach to contract formation, to distinguish sharply between fraud and error
in terms of both the range of relevant mistakes and the effect of the defect, to
reject a protective rationale for nullity for error, and to ignore whether the error
was unilateral or bilateral and whether it was excusable. Together with his use
of the term “error in the substantials”, this seems to place Stair firmly in the
ius commune tradition, treating error in the substantials as merely the real-world
trigger for other rules of contract law.
Against this view, it might be argued that Stair treats error as a defect in a deed
and a plea in its own right. However, he does the same with forgery91 and no one
would suggest that the ultimate reason that a forged deed has no effect is that it is
forged. Rather, it has no effect because the normal requirements for constitution
of such deeds have not been fulfilled. Forgery is the explanation for failure not
the cause.
88 De Zulueta, Sale (n 16) 25; Zimmermann, Obligations (n 12) 592.
89 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 398
90 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 70, 74.
91 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 4.40.39.
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C. FROM STAIR TO BELL
The general approach to the conclusion of contracts in Scotland in the period
between Stair and Bell is consistent with Stair’s approach. Emphasis continued
to be placed on consent tout court rather than directly on offer meeting
acceptance.92 The objective meaning of deeds continued, as a general rule, to
be favoured by means of excluding parole evidence and pleas inconsistent with
the plain meaning of the deed,93 and the arguments used to justify exclusion
continued to be based on scepticism rather than irrelevance.94 However,
exceptions were made in some cases, particularly where the mistake was patent.95
As the nineteenth century progressed, a substantive objectivism began to
emerge in place of the evidential approach. In Earl of Minto v Elliott, for instance,
Lord Craigie contrasted “what has actually been done” with “our conjectures of
what may have been intended”.96 Such observations were, however, no more than
initial stirrings. The other judges in the case placed much more emphasis on the
actual intention of the granter, despite the fact that the case involved a tailzie and
so was subject to strict interpretation.
(1) Bankton
Bankton’s approach is essentially the same as Stair’s. He contrasts “error in the
substantials” with error “in some extrinsic circumstance”. The former is said to
“vitiate” the contract and to “relieve the party in error” because “it excludes all
consent” while the latter “is not regarded, unless it is induced fraudulently by
the other party”.97 He offers no elaboration on the meaning of “error in the
substantials” beyond the classic example of one thing being sold for another.98
The contrast drawn between mistakes relevant for circumvention and for error is
very similar to Stair’s. Bankton seems to have had unilateral error in mind because
he speaks about relief of “the party in error”.
92 Bankton, Institute (n 70) 1.11.20, 1.19.1; J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773) 3.3.1;
Baron David Hume, Lectures 1786-1822 vol II (ed G C H Paton, Stair Society vol 13, 1949) 3.
93 Bankton, Institute (n 70) 1.11.54, 4.45.155; Duke of Hamilton v Douglas (1762) Mor 4358 (appealed
on a different point: (1779) 2 Pat App 449);MacLagan v Dickson (1832) 11 S 165.
94 Counsel in Duke of Hamilton v Douglas argued that “It would be of the most dangerous consequence
to allow a witness to explain away the legal import of a settlement”: (1762) Mor 4358 at 4372 (emphasis
added).
95 Wauchope v Hamilton (1711) Mor 5712; Cochran v Bryson (1713) Mor 11627 (explained in E Clive,
“Interpretation”, in Reid & Zimmermann (eds), History (n 1) 47 at 53); Coutts & Co v Allan & Co
(1758) Mor 11549; Inglis v Cunningham (1826) 4 Murr 73.
96 14 Feb 1823 FC at 154.
97 Bankton, Institute (n 70) 1.23.63. See also 1.11.67.
98 Cf “aliud pro alio venisse videtur” in D 18.1.9.2 (Ulpian).
Vol 14 2010 the roots of error in the scots law of contract 403
Bankton also discusses error in his treatment of sale: “Consent being requisite
in all contracts, an error in the substance of the thing sold annuls the sale, but
not where it is in accidental qualities only”.99 In the latter case, Bankton holds
that the sale is valid but the buyer can claim diminution of the price and, if the
seller knew of the defect, damages as well. In the former case, the buyer simply
recovers the price paid regardless of his level of loss or the culpability of the seller.
Where the error relates to one of the accidentals, the level recovered might be
less (in the case of a minor defect) or more (in the case of a knowing seller and
consequential losses) than the price paid.
The thinking in cases where the error relates to the accidental qualities appears
to assume the validity of the contract of sale and to pay attention both to the
harm suffered by the party in error and to the culpability of the other party.
Where there is error in substantia, on the other hand, no attention is paid to
fault or loss. The difference makes sense if nullity for error is merely a reflection
of the requirements for formation of contract. It is much less sensible if error
is an independent doctrine: why penalise the buyer because his defect was in a
substantial rather than an accidental quality?
(2) Erskine
Erskine devotes much less attention to error and the structure of his approach
is rather different. This is not surprising since Erskine’s model was Mackenzie,
who did not address error directly, while Bankton’s was Stair. Like Stair and
Bankton, Erskine discusses “error in the essentials” (as he calls it) in the context of
consent.100 He uses the classic examples: error in persona and error in substantia
in sale. Erskine’s presentation of error in substantia ties it very closely to error as
to the identity of the object of sale: “as if one contracting to sell a piece of gold
plate, should deliver to the purchaser one of brass”.
Thus far Erskine’s attitude is fairly conservative. However, he departs from
the distinction, found in Stair and Bankton, between the effect of error and of
fraud on contracts. Erskine suggests that the defrauded party “is justly said not
to have contracted, but to be deceived”.101 He deals with force and fear in the
same section, suggesting that it too gives rise to nullity. This presentation of error,
force and fraud as a triumvirate of vices of consent is common in European
99 1.19.6. Bankton’s approach was followed in MacLean v MacNeill 23 June 1757 FC.
100 Erskine, Institute (n 92) 3.1.16.
101 3.1.16. Later, he does recognise that bona fide purchasers are not vulnerable on account of the fraud
of their authors but this is explained in terms of special rules protecting the faith of the records and
freedom of commerce in moveables and bills of exchange: 3.5.10.
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systems today.102 However, while modern systems tend to treat all three vices
as giving rise to their equivalent of voidability, Erskine treats them as giving
rise to voidness. He seems to suggest that there is no true consent when it has
been fraudulently induced. His attitude to error may not, therefore, have been
substantially different from that of Stair or Bankton, although his attitude to
fraud certainly was. Fraud has been brought to the level of error, rather than the
other way around. This view is bolstered by the fact that, in his discussion of the
particular grounds of reduction, he mentions interdictions, inhibitions, the law of
deathbed, and minority, force and fear and fraud, but says nothing of error.103
(3) Three cases
Stair, Bankton and Erskine all discuss error without reference to case law. The
eighteenth century did, however, see some relevant cases.
(a) Dunlop v Crookshanks
Error is not mentioned at all in Dunlop v Crookshanks104 but the case was
to prove important in the discussion of error in persona by both Bell and
M P Brown.105 It concerned the sale of spirits by Dunlop to Forbes, a bankrupt
merchant. Forbes’ order was fraudulent on two grounds: that he was insolvent
when he made it106 and that he placed the order on behalf of himself and
Crookshanks “in Company”.107 Crookshanks and Forbes had previously ordered
goods from Dunlop together but Crookshanks knew nothing of this order. Forbes
also ordered a second set of goods on his own behalf. All of the goods were
then sold on. The truth about Forbes’ circumstances emerged and an array of
actions for payment, arrestments, multiplepoindings, and actions of reduction was
unleashed.
There was particular dispute as to whether Dunlop was able to recover the
goods he had sold. A distinction was drawn between the two orders. In the first,
the court held that ownership had not transferred because Dunlop had intended
to transfer “not to William Forbes alone, but to William Forbes and William
102 Reflected, for instance, in art 1109 Code civil and §§ 119-124 BGB. See also C von Bar, E Clive
and H Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft
Common Frame of Reference (2009) II.–7:201-II.–7:207.
103 Erskine, Institute (n 92) 4.1.25.
104 (1752) Mor 4879; Elchies, “Fraud” nos 25 and 26.
105 M P Brown, A Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821) §§ 221-222; Bell, Principles (n 2) § 11.
106 Dunlop is one of several cases which illustrate Scottish adherence to the broader ius commune
principle that it is fraudulent to buy goods when you know yourself to be irrecoverably insolvent.
107 That is, as partners.
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Crookshanks in Company”. Since the latter had refused the goods, ownership
remained with Dunlop. The offer to transfer had not been accepted by the person
to whom it was made.108 As for the second order, there was general agreement
that, despite the fraud, “the property would nevertheless be transferred” and that
a bona fide purchaser was therefore protected.109 The first order parallels Stair’s
example of error in persona and the court shared Stair’s view of the difference
in effect between fraud and error. The decision was made by reference to the
principles of consensus without specific reference to error.
The case is further evidence for the view that decisions on error were based
on the technical requirements for conclusion of contract and transfer rather than
on a desire to protect party in error. Since Dunlop was a merchant and had been
willing to conclude a second contract with Forbes alone, it would have been very
difficult to argue that, had he known the truth, he would not also have concluded
the first contract with Forbes alone.110 On a scholastic-natural law analysis, this
would suggest that he did not deserve protection. Such reasoning is irrelevant
to an analysis which simply focuses on the presence or absence of the requisite
agreement.
(b) Sword v Sinclairs
The best known eighteenth-century case on error is Sword v Sinclairs.111 The
defenders wrote to their agent, instructing him to sell tea at 2s 8d or more per
pound. The agent duly contracted with the pursuer for the sale of 600lb at 2s
8d. However, the defenders had intended to write 3s 8d in their instructions to
the agent and they refused to perform, alleging an error in pretio. The pursuer
replied that the Civil Law authorities were really about the absence of consensus
in idem and that there could be no question of the absence of consensus in this
case. The Lords found for the defenders.
No record of the court’s reasoning is preserved, leaving the field open for
a variety of suggested rationes.112 Lord Dunpark113 and Professor McBryde114
108 This analysis is clear from the Lords’ interlocutor recorded by Kilkerran (Mor 4879 at 4880). Lord
Elchies also held this view but he seems to have had the impression that his judicial colleagues based
their decision regarding the first sale on fraud rather than failure to agree to the transfer: see Elchies,
“Fraud” no 25.
109 (1752) Mor 4879 at 4881.
110 At the very least, there is no evidence that the court required him to demonstrate this fact.
111 (1771) Mor 14241.
112 The various analyses are summarised in W W McBryde, “A note on Sword v Sinclair and the law of
error” 1997 JR 281.
113 Steel v Bradley (Homes) Ltd 1972 SC 48 at 55.
114 McBryde (n 112).
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have cast doubt on the assumption that the case rested on unilateral error
preventing consensus.115 They suggest that the vitiating factor was bad faith on
the part of the buyer who, being a professional in the field, must have known
that error lay behind the offer. But while the obviousness of the error was
important, the buyer – assuming a subjective theory of consensus tempered by
evidential objectivism –was not being penalised for bad faith directly. Rather,
the implausibly low price convinced the court that the offer as written was
not what the seller had intended.116 This position is supported by two earlier
cases, Wauchop v Hamilton117 and Coutts & Co v Allan & Co,118 in which the
court refused to bind a party to a written deed where the expression was clearly
erroneous. In the former case, the Lords referred to writing the term “northwest”
when “northeast” had been intended as an error in calculo and invoked the maxim
plus valere quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur.
The Session Papers for Sword show that, as well as describing their mistake
as an error in pretio, the defenders characterised their statement of the price as
an error in calculo.119 If Sword is read so as to be consistent withWauchop, then
error in calculo is not a mistake in the mental process of calculating the price (that
is, the motive for the offer of the price). Rather it is, in Gloag’s words, “a slip of the
tongue or the pen”, a failure of expression.120 In Sword, the defective expression
concerned the price and thus there was an error in calculo and in pretio. The
result of this was dissensus as to the price: the seller intended to sell at 3s 8d and
the buyer to buy at 2s 8d.
This analysis is supported by the result inCoutts & Co. A contract was enforced
on the terms which the parties were taken to have intended although they wrote
something else. As discussed above, if writing the wrong thing is error and error
is a vice of consent, akin to fraud, then this result cannot be accounted for.
A contract could be struck down but its terms could not be reformed. Taken
together, the cases suggest a subjective approach to the conclusion and content
of contracts rather than an initially objective approach tempered by error as a vice
of consent.
115 Bell, Principles (n 2) §§ 11, 92; W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 438.
116 It is perhaps noteworthy that the main objection anticipated in the seller’s petition is not good faith
but scepticism: “But the pursuer will say, How does it appear that there was any error in this case?
and what evidence have your Lordships that Mess Sinclair, when they wrote 2s 8d meant 3s 8d? or, in
short that there was any mistake in the matter?” In fact, the mistake was not disputed but good faith
was averred by the buyer. This did not do him any good. See Session Papers: Campbell Collection
vol 21 nos 6, 7 and Arniston Collection vol 104 no 7.
117 (1711) Mor 5712.
118 (1758) Mor 11549.
119 Session Papers: Campbell Collection vol 21 no 6 at 8.
120 Gloag, Contract (n 115) 437.
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(c) Forbes v Forbes
One case casts significant doubt on this approach. In Forbes v Forbes121 a widow
granted certain restrictions to her entitlements under a marriage contract in
return for an agreement by her husband’s heir not to challenge grants made to
her daughters. In fact, the heir had no right to challenge the grants anyway. Lady
Forbes successfully challenged her deed of restriction, arguing that it had been
obtained by “surprize, and upon fundamental error; and by fraud and imposition”.
The decision appears to have turned on “fundamental error” since no evidence of
fraud or imposition seems to have been produced.
The case is significant because Lady Forbes’ error did not concern what she
was doing but her reasons for doing it. It implies a doctrine of error which
covers errors beyond the content of the contract and which cannot therefore be
explained on the basis of the rules on formation. The decision is also surprising
because the deed of restriction looks like a transaction in the formal sense of
the term,122 and by the mid-eighteenth century it was uncontroversial that errors
concerning the motives or circumstances of such a settlement were not sufficient
to set it aside.123 Forbes appears to have had little impact, however, perhaps
because it was not reported until Paton published the second volume of his
edition of House of Lords appeals in 1851.
In 1833, the House of Lords refused to allow a trustee in sequestration to
reduce a bond in very similar circumstances. The bond had been granted to
induce a security-holder to desist from sale of part of the bankrupt’s estate. There
was, however, a problem with the sasine taken on the security, so the creditor
would have had no preference for the proceeds of the sale.124 It is difficult to
gather a clear ratio from the case: the only speech with reasons in the House
of Lords is Lord Wynford’s dissent. The result, however, is consistent with the
traditional Scottish approach. Even if the sasine was null, the security-holder
had a mandate to sell the property although he had no preference for the price.
The trustee gave the bond to induce the security-holder to desist from exercising
this mandate. The error might have affected the trustee’s decision but it did not
prevent the agreement of the requisite elements and therefore the transaction
was valid.
121 (1765) 2 Pat App 84. The background can be found at (1755) Mor 3277, (1756) 2 Pat App 8 and (1760)
2 Pat App 36.
122 I. e. a mutual discharge of potential rights.
123 Stair, Institutions (n 57) 1.17.2; Stewart v Stewart (1839) Macl & R 401 at 432-434 per Lord
Cottenham LC.
124 Grieve v Wilson (1833) 6 W & S 543.
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(4) Hume
In his lectures at Edinburgh University, Hume did not address contract in general
but his treatment of sale contains the most extensive discussion of error prior to
Bell. He is also the first to cite Scottish cases. Bell attended Hume’s lectures in
1787-1788.125
Having established that the “essence” of sale is consent about the object and
price,126 and discussed the degree of precision with which the object and price
must be identified, Hume proceeds to ask if “the consent of the parties upon
these is a true and genuine and fair consent”.127 He expands, suggesting that it
is not so where the “parties are disabled by liquor” or the consent is “proceeding
upon substantial error” or “procured by fraud and imposition” and that “the effect
of any of these things is to utterly invalidate the contract”. Here Hume seems
to follow Erskine in suggesting that both fraud and error lead to voidness.128
However, Hume’s approach seems, at first sight, to imply an attitude closer to
Grotius. He looks for consent first and then addresses his mind to questions of
fraud and error. Error seems to be treated as a vice of consent.
Despite this, an examination of the rest of Hume’s discussion shows adherence
to the traditional approach. His discussion of contractual writings, for instance,
focuses on what the parties “truly intended”.129 As noted, error is presented as
giving rise to nullity and he considers the classic cases of substantial error, all of
which strike directly at the substantialia of sale: error in persona, error in pretio
and error regarding the object sold. The examples that he gives of the first two
are clear cases of dissensus.130 Hume gives a more extensive account of these
cases than any of his Scottish predecessors. In particular, he reflects Continental
attempts to refine the notion of error in substantia, most famously articulated by
Pothier.131
The apparent contradictions in the Digest texts on error in substantia had
provoked debate about its nature for many years.132 The breakdown of the
hegemony of Aristotelian metaphysics as a result of the Renaissance and the
125 Some caution is needed, since the Stair Society edition of Hume’s lectures is based on the lectures as
delivered in 1821-1822. There may have been some development in Hume’s thought since the course
of lectures which Bell heard in the first full session after Hume’s appointment as Professor of Scots
Law: see D MWalker, The Scottish Jurists (1985) 337.
126 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 3.
127 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 7.
128 But see 17 where Hume discusses the effect of fraud and departs expressly from Erskine’s position.
129 Vol II, 22.
130 Vol II, 8.
131 R J Pothier, Traité des obligations, in M Siffrein (ed),Oeuvres de Pothier vol 1 (1821) § 18; Schermaier,
Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 390-391.
132 Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums (n 4) 390.
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Enlightenment presented further problems.133 It was no longer possible simply to
refer to the distinction between essential and accidental characteristics as if this
were a matter of metaphysical fact. Hume fills the gap by looking to the parties’
intentions. His examples are an estate sold with a villa which turns out not to
include the land the villa is on, a ship which turns out to have been wrecked at
the time of sale, and a superiority purchased because it carried a right to vote
which did not carry such a right.134
These cases might look like error in motive and evidence of a protective
rationale. We should bear in mind, however, that Hume’s rationale is very similar
to Ulpian’s: “Though he get the individual stipulated corpus, yet he does not get
the sort of commodity or description of subject which alone he meant to buy”.135
The language is that of intention rather than motive. Further, his errors must
relate to some characteristic of the object of sale rather than an external factor136
and “the point in which the error lies [must] be such as enters the bargain of the
parties – such which serves as the medium of contracting between them”.137 If
a characteristic “enters the bargain”, it must do so either as a condition, which
would be sufficient to prevent any obligation in and of itself, or as part of the
definition of the object of sale, in which case the reasoning set out in relation to
common error in substantia in the ius commune applies.138 Hume discusses cases
where the object of sale has been destroyed at the time of contracting alongside
cases regarding characteristics which an object is thought to have but does not.139
What links these cases is the non-existence of the object of sale that the parties
have in mind. Of course, the requirement that the relevant characteristic be part
of the bargain between the parties makes unilateral error impossible.
(5) Brown
M P Brown’s Treatise on the Law of Sale was published in 1821, four years
before the discussion of error which would eventually form §11 of Bell’s Principles
first appeared in the fifth edition of the same author’s Commentaries.140 Brown
133 Hume’s education was supervised by his more famous uncle (Walker, Scottish Jurists (n 125) 316)
so he was more acutely aware of this than most.
134 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 8-10. The last example is perhaps a little surprising, given MacLean v
MacNeill 23 June 1757 FC.
135 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 8.
136 As is clear from his discussion at 11 of silence as to facts which affect the price.
137 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 10.
138 See text at nn 21-29 above.
139 Hume, Lectures vol II (n 92) 8-9.
140 G J Bell, Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence,
5th edn (1826) vol I, 294-295.
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prefigures Bell’s treatment by using English cases to illustrate the Scots law of
error and by referring to Pothier. As with Bell, the latter clearly exerted a much
more significant influence than the former.141
(a) Error as dissensus
Several aspects of Brown’s treatment suggest that where error matters, it matters
because it operates to prevent consent and thus that the rules on consent are
what really do the work. First, Brown’s account of consent is strongly subjective.
He uses Pothier’s description of consent: “the concourse of the will of the vendor
to sell the thing in question to the vendee at a certain price, and the will of the
vendee to purchase the said thing at the said price”.142 Brown also endorses
Pothier’s position on revocation of offers.143 The French jurist posited a case
where an offer is made by letter, after which a second letter is sent, revoking
the offer. In the interval between the delivery of the two letters, the offeree
writes to the offerer accepting the offer. According to Pothier, there was no
contract: the offerer’s will to contract did not persist until the offer was accepted
and therefore there was no concourse of wills.144 He and Brown recognised
the need to compensate the offeree for any loss suffered but did so on the
basis of a general equitable duty rather than by invoking the validity of the
contract.
Secondly, Brown’s consideration of error is integral to his assessment of
consent rather than being applied ex post to consent which has already been
established. He deals with instances of error in the course of discussion of the
elements which must be agreed for a valid sale.145 Fraud, on the other hand, is
treated much later in his work alongside force and fear as a ground for setting
contracts aside.146 Brown makes it clear that, while there is no consent in cases
of relevant error, in cases of fraud there is real, albeit defective consent. The
141 Pothier also exercised a significant influence on English law in this area: see C MacMillan, Mistakes
in Contract Law (2010) ch 5. Pothier’s general approach to error is much closer to the traditional ius
commune view than to the scholastic-natural law treatment: MacMillan, Mistakes 101-104.
142 Brown, Sale (n 105) § 211; R J Pothier, Traité du contrat de vente, in M Siffrein (ed), Oeuvres de
Pothier vol 3 (1821) § 31.
143 Brown, Sale (n 105) § 212.
144 Pothier, Vente (n 142) § 32.
145 Brown, Sale (n 105) §§ 214-224; Pothier, Vente (n 142) §§ 34-37. Brown does have some difficulty
integrating error in persona into this scheme. It is rather implausibly handled under error relating to
the thing sold. The reason for this may be that Brown’s structure is borrowed from Traité du contrat de
vente and Pothier only addresses error in persona in the Traité des obligations. There error in persona
is addressed immediately after error in substantia.
146 Brown, Sale (n 105) §§ 554-560, 577-615.
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point emerges in his treatment Dunlop v Crookshanks,147 his example of error
in persona. Brown stresses the distinction, drawn by Lord Elchies, between this
case and cases of fraud. As Brown puts it, “Error renders a contract essentially
null: fraud merely renders it voidable”.148 Brown uses the contrast to explain why
error in a prior contract could be pled against an onerous bona fide successor
while fraud could not.149
Thirdly, the specific classes of error discussed are those familiar in the ius
commune tradition: error in corpore, in negotii, in pretio and in substantia. In the
last of these Brown uses the traditional Aristotelian distinction between essential
and accidental qualities, and groups error in corpore and in substantia together
as examples of failure to agree on the object of sale. The numerus clausus of
relevant errors contrasts sharply with the approach in cases of fraud, where the
“but for” test used in Stair’s treatment of fraud and in Grotius’ treatment of error
is employed.
(b) Pothier and error in persona
Thus far, Brown follows the approach of those who had gone before him.
However, in one point Brown’s approach differs from that of his predecessors.
Error in persona had long been central to discussion of error in Scotland. Brown
repeats the rule150 but endorses Pothier’s distinction between cases where the
identity of the counterparty mattered and cases where it did not. Error in persona
only affected validity in the former case. Thus, a loan, a gift or a contract to have a
picture painted would be null if the lender, donor or commissioner was mistaken
as to the identity of the counterparty but error would not have the same effect in
a cash sale.151
Pothier explains the latter result in the following terms:152
ce n’est pas précisément et personnellement à Pierre qu’il a voulu vendre ce livre,
mais à la personne qui lui donneroit le prix qu’il demandoit, quelle qu’elle fût; et par
conséquent il est vrai de dire que c’est à moi, qui étois cette personne, qu’il a voulu
vendre son livre.
147 (1752) Mor 4879, discussed at C.(3)(a) above.
148 Brown, Sale (n 105) § 221.
149 Sale §§ 221, 599-602. Brown appears to have regarded a iusta causa traditionis as necessary for a valid
transfer. Elchies’ and Kilkerran’s reports of Dunlop are less clear on this point.
150 At some cost to his overall structure: see Brown, Sale (n 105) § 220.
151 Pothier, Obligations (n 131) § 19, quoted by Brown, Sale (n 105) § 220.
152 Pothier, Obligations (n 131) § 19. This is translated by W D Evans (1806) as follows: “it was not
precisely and personally to Peter that he wanted to sell the book, but to any body who was willing to
give the price of it, [and] it may be truly affirmed of me, that I was the person to whom he intended
to sell his book”.
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Pothier’s reasoning here can be understood by reference to the distinction
between error in persona and error in nomine (error regarding the name
of a person or thing). Since Roman times, the latter had been regarded as
irrelevant.153 If you intend to buy an orange, it does not matter that you
think oranges are called apples. Similarly, it does not matter that the seller
believes the person standing in front of him is called Pierre (when in fact he
is called Robert) if the seller really intends to contract with the person in front
of him.
The distinction between this case, and the case where the seller intended to
contract with Pierre (whom he believed to be standing in front of him), is clear
enough in theory but can be difficult in practice since names are often the main
mechanism for identification. These problems would, of course, be exacerbated
by the procedural restrictions onmethods of proof which applied in Scotland until
1853. Against that background, a party’s interest in the identity of his counterparty
is a useful guide to his true intentions. The distinction between the two cases
operates at a procedural rather than a substantive level.
It is possible, however, to read Pothier’s distinction in another way, and to see it
as a substantive criterion rather than an evidential guide. On this reading, Pothier
echoes concerns in the natural law and scholastic traditions about whether relief
for error is deserved. If a party would have been just as happy to contract
with anyone else, he is thought not to deserve protection from his error since
he has not been prejudiced by it. Error as to identity is irrelevant because
belief about the identity of the counterparty did not motivate the decision to
contract.
The evidential view seems preferable for two reasons. Since Pothier rejects the
relevance of error in motive in the next section of his work,154 it is unlikely that
he was seeking to incorporate a motive-based criterion into his consideration of
error in persona. Further, in his discussion of the painting case, he imposes a non-
contractual duty of compensation on the party in error. This technique is similar
to his approach to revocation of offers and it shows a tendency to stick to a strictly
subjective approach to consensus and to correct unwanted results with equitable,
extra-contractual duties. The fact that one party does not deserve protection does
not affect Pothier’s analysis of the contract, but it does make him impose a duty
to compensate.
153 D 18.1.9.1 (Ulpian).
154 Pothier, Obligations (n 131) § 20.
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Brown illustrates Pothier’s two classes of error in persona with Dunlop v
Crookshanks155 and the English case of Mitchell v Lapage.156 He summarises
them thus:157
[In Dunlop] it appeared that the error in the name of the vendee was a material
circumstance, and that the vendor would have suffered a loss if it had been held that
there was a valid contract . . . [InMitchell] it appeared, on the other hand, that the error
in the name was immaterial, and therefore it was held, in conformity with Pothier’s rule,
that the validity of the contract was not affected by it, unless the party founding upon
the error could shew that he had suffered any prejudice in consequence.
This account is rather surprising for two reasons. In Dunlop, there is no direct
discussion of error or its materiality.158 Instead the focus is directly on the fact
that the seller had intended to sell to one person while another purported to
buy. This was discernable from the letters and the differing treatment of the two
sales. There was no need to have recourse to questions of materiality. If Dunlop
is relevant, however, it pushes us towards the first rather than the second reading
of Pothier because of the emphasis on whom the seller intended to contract
with.
In Mitchell an agent, intending to sell on behalf of one firm, did so in the
name of a second, which had previously been his principal but was no longer in
existence. The court allowed the first firm to enforce the contract, holding that
no prejudice had been suffered as a result of the mistake. On its face, Brown’s
summary suggests a distinction between materiality of the error and prejudice
so that an error which was immaterial might nonetheless vitiate a contract if
prejudice followed. The focus is thus on protection from loss rather than on the
decision to contract. Examination of the judgment, however, suggests that such
an approach would be erroneous. No reference is made to materiality, only to
prejudice, so the court drew no such distinction. In the context in which Brown
uses it, the case seems best read as saying that the lack of prejudice shows that
the error was not material and thus that the buyer had intended to contract with
the agent’s principal, whoever that may have been, rather than with the particular
named firm.159
So understood, the decisions are consistent with the first reading of Pothier.
In other areas, Brown’s approach is very much in line with the subjective view of
155 (1752) Mor 4879.
156 (1816) 171 ER 233, Holt 253.
157 Brown, Sale (n 105) § 222.
158 Although it might be argued that the identity of the buyer is always material in a credit sale.
159 The judge was also motivated by apparent tacit ratification of the contract by the buyer after he had
learned the truth. There may have been hints of estoppel by representation too.
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contract formation and the analysis of error as a real-world obstacle to consent
evident in the earlier Scottish materials. Although Brown’s language does not at
first sight encourage the idea, it is also possible to accommodate Pothier’s view of
error in persona within the traditional framework.
D. BELL’S APPROACH
(1) General theory of contracts
Bell gives the parties’ will and subjective consent pride of place in his account of
conventional obligations.160 In doing so, he invokes Stair’s “three acts of the will”
account and goes on to discuss the “Nature and Requisites of Consent”.161 Offer
and acceptance are discussed but, rather than being treated as the paradigm for
consent, they are simply one mechanism by which consensus may be achieved.162
It is noteworthy that Bell appears to endorse Pothier’s position on revocation of
offers, although his language is less explicit than Brown’s.163
The view that Bell had an essentially subjective approach to consensus is
bolstered by later case law. The key authority for substantive objectivism is
Muirhead & Turnbull v Dickson, decided as late as 1905.164 While it is possible to
look back now on earlier cases likeHiggins & Sons vWilson &Co165 and Thomson
v James166 and see them as laying the foundations for such a decision, it is not clear
that they were so understood at the time. These cases were solely concerned
with the timings of offers and acceptances and did not address differing views
as to the content of the obligation. Even as he affirmed the postal acceptance
rule in Thomson, Lord Ivory stressed that “both parties must be agreed as to all
conditions essential to the contract; otherwise the one party would have in view
one contract, and the other a different one”.167 Prior to Muirhead & Turnbull168
and even after it,169 objectivism was understood in the traditional Scots manner,
as a rule of evidence. The substantive approach seems to have become firmly
160 Bell, Principles (n 2) § 7.
161 Principles §§ 10-14.
162 Principles § 72.
163 Principles § 73. There seems to have been a slight shift since Bell’s first discussion of offer and
acceptance in the 4th edition of the Commentaries (1821) vol I §§ 259-263, where the view of offers
appears to be closer to Stair than Pothier.
164 (1905) 7 F 686.
165 (1847) 9 D 1407.
166 (1855) 18 D 1.
167 (1855) 18 D 1 at 15.
168 Buchanan v Duke of Hamilton (1878) 5 R (HL) 69.
169 E.g. Bank of Scotland v Crerar 1921 SC 736 at 752 per Lord President Clyde; T B Smith, Short
Commentary (n 1) 812.
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established only on the basis of Gloag170 as endorsed by Lord Reid inM’Cutcheon
v David MacBrayne Ltd.171
(2) Error
Error is discussed by Bell as part of his treatment of the “Nature and Requisites
of Consent”.172 Within this section, he also deals with force and fraud, following
the example of Domat, Pothier and Erskine.173 Bell’s major discussion on the
relationship between error and fraud is the “Note relative to Sections 11, 12
and 13” which appears after § 14:
The want of consent, when the obligation proceeds from error or force, annuls the
contract: But the nullity must be declared judicially. The contract ostensibly is valid and
regular; and 1. it subsists till it be reduced; 2. it will be effectual against third parties
without notice . . . A distinction has been taken in the case of fraud that it will not be
effectual as a ground of reduction against third parties; seeing there is here consent,
though proceeding on a false ground. Is there any real ground for such a distinction?
The passage is somewhat difficult to follow and has led some to conclude that Bell
thought that error rendered a contract voidable rather than void.174 Proponents
of that view can point to the requirement that the nullity “be declared judicially”
and to the words “it subsists till it be reduced”. On the other hand, Bell clearly,
albeit reluctantly, acknowledges that the general view is that espoused by Stair
and Brown: that there is no consent in cases of error whereas there is real but
defective consent in cases of fraud and that this is the reason for the differing
treatment of singular successors in cases of fraud and error.175
The insistence on contracts which are null for error being set aside judicially
may be explained by the influence of Domat. Domat, however, was not motivated
by the idea that the contract subsisted; rather he was concerned to avoid self
help.176 On balance, therefore, it seems better to conclude that Bell regarded
error as giving rise to voidness rather than voidability.
Bell gives five categories of “error in substantials”: subjects (that is, the
object of sale), person (where the contract is delectus personae), price, quality
(“if expressly or tacitly essential to the bargain”), and the nature of the
170 Gloag, Contract (n 115) 7.
171 1964 SC (HL) 28 at 35.
172 Bell, Principles (n 2) §§ 10-14.
173 J Domat, Loix civiles dans leur ordre natural (new edn, 1756) 1.1.2 § 2; Pothier, Obligations (n 131)
§ 16; Erskine, Institute (n 92) 3.1.16.
174 Smith, Short Commentary (n 1) 815-816; Gloag, Contract (n 115) 442 n 3.
175 See also Bell, Commentaries (n 140) vol I, 297.
176 Domat, Loix civiles (n 173) 1.1.5 § 16.
416 the edinburgh law review Vol 14 2010
contract.177 These categories were well known to Scots lawyers by the time Bell
employed them. Even the limitations applied to error regarding the person and
quality had been seen before, in the work of Brown andHume respectively. There
has been some dispute as to whether error in substantia or materia is part of
Bell’s first category or of his fourth.178 Since the rationale for accepting error
in substantia is that it meant that one or both of the parties really had
a different object of sale in mind, the distinction does not seem of much
importance.
As LordWatson notes,179 Bell says nothing about whether the error in question
is unilateral or mutual. Lord Watson doubted that unilateral uninduced error
would often be relevant and his reserve is perhaps shared by Stein, who observes
that none of the cases cited by Bell involves such error. If, however, the view
taken here of Bell’s theory of contract is correct, then uninduced unilateral error
would have been relevant180 but very difficult to prove due to the restrictions on
evidence. This view seems the most natural inference to draw from Bell’s silence.
The Principles was written for students, who would surely have assumed that
all errors in substantials were relevant unless told otherwise.181 This position is
consistent with the tradition in Scotland going back to Stair. The problem of
unilateral error is not addressed directly, but the theory of contract espoused
suggests that there would be no substantive obstacle to its being pled.
Since there is nothing new in Bell’s approach, there is nothing in his treatment
which necessitates a move from the analysis presented hitherto. Error is a way of
talking about and explaining the results of other rules of contract law rather than
an independent doctrine. This is highlighted by the fact, as Stein notes, that the
cases Bell cites as authorities for error in relation to an essential quality are cited
in the Commentaries as examples of implied conditions in sale.182
E. CONCLUSION
Bell has acquired a reputation as the father of the doctrine of error in Scots
contract law. Stein says that he “gives a much more comprehensive account
177 Bell, Principles § 11.
178 Gow, “Culpa in docendo” (n 1) at 255; Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract (n 1) 183-184.
179 Stewart v Kennedy (No 2) (1890) 17 R (HL) 25 at 29.
180 Except in the case of quality, where the need for the requisite quality had to be communicated.
181 See also Lord Kyllachy’s opinion in Bennie’s Trs v Couper (1890) 17 R 782.
182 Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract (n 1) 185. SeeChristies v Fairholmes (1748) Mor 4897, cited
by Bell for error in persona in the Principles (n 2) § 11 and for fraud in the Commentaries (n 140)
vol I, 297 and in the Principles § 14.
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than any of his predecessors”183 and Gow suggests “that Professor Bell may
be primarily responsible for the decline of the Scots law of error into a state
bordering on chaos”.184 This may go some way to explaining the comparative
neglect of the sources before Bell. In fact, Bell seems to deserve neither the credit
nor the opprobrium. The picture is one of continuity rather than revolution. Bell’s
was a work of minor synthesis, bringing together strands already present in the
Scottish discourse. If Bell is guilty for the chaos which followed, then so are all
those who preceded him; but, given the stability, simplicity and relative clarity
of the law up to Bell, any blame might be more appropriately directed at his
successors.
183 Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract (n 1) 183.
184 Gow, “Mistake and error” (n 1) at 475.
